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Abstract
This paper aims to analize the role of personal identity in
decision making. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically
the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering
the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our pro-
posal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model
to study how personal identity enters in individuals’ utility func-
tion when facing a Dictator Game decision is then presented.
Finally, this "identity-based" utility function is studied experi-
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“I have a drawer full of labels -architect, husband, father- and none of
them fits" ; Kirk Douglas as Larry Coe in Richard Quine´s Strangers when
we meet (1960).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Dictator Game (DG) has been considered an excellent way of ana-
lyzing altruism in humans because any amount of money not kept by the
dictator was deemed incompatible with a purely selfish subject and ac-
cordingly interpreted as showing some kind of altruism. While classical
extensions of the utility function to include altruism and other pro-social
behavior have done a great deal in explaining deviations from selfish pre-
dictions in Dictator Games, these extensions do not exhaust all possible
options. Indeed, it seems quite unrealistic to attribute every single de-
viation to altruism and social preferences. In this paper we propose
and test experimentally an alternative, simple extension of the utility
function to expand upon our understanding of deviant behavior (from
the standard selfish assumption) in Dictator Games. This extension is
based on the idea that people maximize a utility function that includes
identity-based preferences.
The article is structured as follows. In the following section we crit-
ically review the growing literature on "economics and identity". In the
third section we present a formal model -inspired in the work of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000)-, in which we consider that the subjects establish a
prescription that dictates how an amount of money should be divided in
a DG. Personal identity is thus defined as the accommodation between
what one does and the prescription about what one says one should do.
The experimental design is presented in the fourth section, while the
data is analyzed in the fifth section. Given that contradictions arise be-
tween what subjects do and what they say they should do, we establish
a process of self-understanding1 with a view to shedding some light on
who attaches lesser weight to identity and why and who attaches greater
weight to identity and why. The results of the experiment are discussed
in the sixth section, where we warn of the diﬃculties of attributing iden-
tities to people when explaining economic behavior. Conclusions are
drawn in the seventh section.
1Self-understanding should be understood here as the way people define or cate-
gorize themselves (Turner, 1985; Abrams, 1999; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000).
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II. ECONOMICS AND IDENTITY
Until recently, little attention was given to the concept of identity in
economics. Many have attempted to explain this lack of interest by ap-
pealing to the traditional concept of the homo economicus driven by
self-interest (Basu, 2006; Davis, 2003; Horst et al. 2006; Sen, 1985,
2004, 2006, p. 21). Thus, for example, to explain the so-called wealth
gap between blacks and whites in the United States, standard economics
treats a radically individual self-interested “taste for discrimination” as
an argument in the utility function (Becker, 1971), as if individuals were
not embedded in a social context in which race and racism determine
the conduct and the economic outcomes of blacks and whites, regardless
of their respective tastes for discrimination (Arrow, 1998; Austen-Smith
and Fryer, 2005; Basu, 2005; Darity et al. 2006; Mason, 2001). Yet
not only race, but sex, social class, culture, language or personal loy-
alties towards members of the group or groups to which an individual
belongs also have a decisive weight in economic behavior (Bénabou and
Tirole, 2007; Davis, 2003; Luchini and Teschl, 2005). According to this
standpoint, which is commonly shared by such disciplines as sociology
or social psychology and which is already held to be true in economics,
people’s identity, their sense of self, is shaped in the heart of the groups
with which the individual identifies. The group can therefore have more
weight than the individual and determine norms for acceptation and re-
jection or for solidarity and competence that cannot always be attributed
solely to selfish behavior.
In an article that can be considered the predecessor to the introduc-
tion of identity in economics, George Akerlof shows, for example, how
wealthy parents who try to maximize the economic benefits of their chil-
dren, consider it advantageous to teach them to identify with members
of their own class and to be loyal and honest with them, ‘even though
these traits may in some circumstances cause the individual to engage
in nonmaximizing behavior’ (Akerlof, 1983, p. 61). As Akerlof points
out, individuals cannot identify with their class without being loyal, but
this group loyalty can be detrimental to them. A vast amount of social
psychology literature demonstrates that individuals may indeed incur
enormous personal costs to themselves in benefit of the group to which
they belong (Dawes et al., 1990).
Departing from the empirical evidence on the weight of social iden-
tity in economic and non-economic conduct, George Akerlof and Rachel
Kranton were the first to introduce the concept of identity in an eco-
nomic analysis (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). In Akerlof and Kranton’s
proposal, the utility of individual i is a function of i’s actions, the ac-
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tions of others and of identity I or i’s self-image. On the one hand,
identity is based on the social category that others attribute to a given
person, while on the other it is based on the degree to which the traits
εi of i coincide with the ideal social category that others attribute to
him, which is indicated by prescription P (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000,
p. 719). Social identity therefore involves accommodating one’s own
image and thus one’s own actions to that ideal. Insofar as individuals
internalize the code of conduct linked to a prescribed behavior, feel-
ings of anxiety and cognitive dissonance may be evoked when violating
the prescription. Likewise, the person may have a higher sense of self
when accommodating the behavior prescribed by the reference group.
Nonetheless, as Akerlof and Kranton point out, general agreement does
not exist regarding social categories and prescriptions, thus providing
the individual the option to choose her total or partial identity.
The pioneer article by Akerlof and Kranton led to an authentic boom
in research on identity and economics -giving rise to the creation of a new
field of study: the economics of identity (Kirman and Teschl, 2004). Part
of this research has applied, developed or modified the model proposed
by these authors in concrete studies on identity. Others have attempted
to propose new general models of behavior to include identity in an eco-
nomic analysis. Akerlof and Kranton’s own studies are among the former
type. In the first paper in which they apply their model (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2002), the authors demonstrate that students’ performance
depends on their identity, that is, the social category that is attributed
to them ("crowd leader", "nerds" or "burnouts") and how they accom-
modate their self-image to this category. In order to maximize their
utility, students must not only maximize their eﬀort, but must fit into
a category. In a second study (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005), they show
how workers’ eﬃciency improves when they identify with their company.
Other examples of studies applied to concrete cases in which the eco-
nomic outcomes of identity are expressly analyzed, include studies on
racial conflict (Basu, 2005; Benjamin et al., 2006; Bodenhorn and Rue-
beck, 2003; Darity et al. 2006; Mason, 2001), religious identity (Minkler
and Cosgel, 2004); trust and identity (Güth et al., forthcoming), eco-
nomic development (Basu, 2006), identity and microfinance programs
(Chatterjee and Sarangi, 2004), consumption of symbolic goods (Dolf-
sma, 2004; Starr, 2004), political integration (Wichardt, 2005), identity
and cooperative social norms (Wichardt, 2007), or law and economics of
identity (Hill, 2005).
There are much fewer general models. One of the most notable is
the evolutionary model by Bénabou and Tirole (2007), who present a
general theoretical model to explain people’s beliefs about their deepest
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values and how preferences for identity, dignity and taboos interfere in
these beliefs. Davis (forthcoming), on the other hand, transforms Akerlof
and Kranton’s utility function by making personal identity a function of
individual identity, which is at the same time a function of social identity.
Given that we all have multiple social identities, personal identity implies
the capacity to choose from among numerous social categories according
to their utility.
In spite of the unquestionable interest that these investigations arouse,
it is striking that although the concept is questioned by other disciplines,
particularly sociology and political science, economics addresses the con-
cept of social identity and does not take into account these widespread
criticisms. The main criticisms regarding the concept of social identity
can be grouped into three categories.
a. Conceptual ambiguity
The meanings of "identity" abound in the sociological, political sci-
ence and psychological literature. Identity can be people’s concept of
who they are and how they relate with others; biological aspects which
acquire a socially constructed meaning of identity (race, gender); iden-
tification with national, cultural or linguistic symbols; role-specific un-
derstanding and expectations about self; cognitive schemata by which
the individual knows the world; the prescriptive representation of polit-
ical actors; expressivist behavior or non-instrumental modes of action;
the unstable, multiple and fragmented contemporary self, etc.2 Thus,
‘the term “identity” is made to do a great deal of work’ (Brubaker and
Cooper, 2000, p. 8). In economics the term is made to do a great deal
of work too. In the recent literature on economics and identity we find
that identity is understood as a payoﬀ, as a set of social categories, as an
interiorized social norm, as the belief in profound personal values, as a
perceptual lens or as non-instrumental deontological elements of action.3
These myriad definitions pose reasonable doubts as to the usefulness of
a concept which is at best vague and capable of encompassing multiple
definitions and on the causal tie between identity and action (Aguiar
and de Francisco, 2002; Bicchieri, 2002; MacInnes, 2004; Obershall and
Kim, 1996).
2For an exhaustive critical analysis of these uses see Brubaker and Cooper (2000)
and Fearon (1999).
3For a review of all these meanings see Hill (2005) and Davis (2003; 2006).
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b. Categories of practice vs. categories of analysis
It is often diﬃcult to distinguish if identity refers to the way in which
people understand or see themselves in everyday life and in their social,
political or economic practice, or if identity refers to an analytical con-
cept embedded in a theory of social action. In other words, identity is
not distinguished so much as a category of social practice as a category
of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 4). Much the same occurs
with the concept of identity as with concepts such as race or nation.4
For example, the use that a nationalist makes of the term "nation" does
not have to be the same as that of the political scientist who studies
nationalism. When Akerlof and Kranton analyze the influence of the
feminist movement in the job market, they mix both categories. This is
certainly legitimate, but it is convenient to clarify the diﬀerence, other-
wise it is impossible to know if we are referring to identity as a category
attributed by the researcher to the individual or if we are referring to
identity as a true process of self-categorization.
c. Social identity does not exhaust personal identity
Influenced by sociology and social psychology, the economics of iden-
tity have chiefly focused on social identity, while overlooking personal
identity. When identity is defined as a process of social or intragroupal
identification, people are considered to be ‘embodiments of group proto-
types rather than as independent individuals’ (Davis, forthcoming). Per-
sonal identity thus vanishes in a hypersocialized concept of individual.
But given the notably widespread consensus that people have multiple
identities, it is necessary to appeal to individual or personal identity as a
reference for the individual who reflexively chooses what he or she wants
to be. That is, if the social identity in Akerlof and Kranton’s model in-
volves fitting individual action to a social category that others attribute
to us, personal identity would imply fitting the action to the image that
one has or wishes to have about oneself (Sen, 2004; Teschl, 2006). This
is a complex process full of ambiguities and incoherences that can aﬀect
identification with others. For this reason, as Davis points out, ‘without
some account of the "bearer" of a set of social identities, saying that
4‘[T]he collective fiction labeled “race”. . . has always mixed science with common
sense and traded on the complicity between them’ (Wacquant, 1997: 223). Without
being aware of it, the economics of identity has inherited this trade. For this reason,
the definitions of identity are often confusing since we do not know if people "see
themselves" in this way (identity as a perceptual lens) or it is the researcher who
labels them as such.
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‘an individual identifies with others is largely an empty claim’ (Davis,
forthcoming).
Bearing in mind these criticisms, in the present article we aim to
study the growing interest in the issue of personal identity by means of
a dictator game in order to contribute some insight into the "bearer" of
social identities. Identity is used here as an analytical category, since
individuals do not make express references to their identity or anything
of the kind nor is it something they talk about. The issue of identity (in
the analytical or attributed sense) emerges when subjects in a DG are
made to reflect upon what they should give and what they should keep
-the fairest decision in their opinion- following the action, that is, once
they have given an amount of money or have kept it all for themselves.
Given that this is a question of coherency between what the subjects
have done and what they believe they should do in a context in which
information about others is lacking (i.e. the identity of the recipients)
and in which social identity does not come into play, we find ourselves
before an example of personal identity.
Personal identity can be understood in psychological terms as char-
acter traits (Matthews et al., 2003), from a philosophical standpoint as
one’s self over time (Parfit, 1984) or from a normative approach as the
level of coherency between what people do and what they believe they
should do5. These three aspects of identity can aﬀect individuals’ per-
sonal identity. Thus, personal identity involves a certain stablility of self
between what is done and what one says should be done (Parfit, 1984;
Copp, 2002). We use the term here in the third sense. What we want to
know is to what degree individuals identify with an action or not once
the action has been carried out. Identifying with the actions that one
does is a key element of personal identity and at the same time provides
grounds for our identification with others. It is diﬃcult to identify with
others if our action and the judgement and beliefs about that action
never fit. As we will see below, this coherency is surprisingly lower than
one would expect.
To the best of our knowledge, few economic experiments have been
5To do what one says one should do implies having a reason for action (being this
reason social, political, economic or moral) (Hausman, 1985). It would be impossible
that a person had reasons to do some things and not others and never fulfil them.
This fact would lead her to a problem of personal identity. Moreover, if a person
never does what she says it should be done (as a mother, a member of a club, a
feminist...), she would not have credibility and would undermine the grounds of her
social identity. This aspect of personal identity is central in our experiment. In sum,
it is an aspect, previous to social identity, which determines the grounds of individual
credibility.
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expressly conducted on social and personal identity, and even fewer with
dictator games. However, this is an especially useful tool for analyzing
individuals’ self-image when carrying out an action. In the only work
prior to ours on identity and giving behavior, Ben-Ner et al. (2005)
show how experimental subjects give more money (hypothetical) in a
dictator game to those who are similar to them in a wide range of social
categories. Now, as we have said, in our case we want to analyze how
the subject identifies herself and with her action as one of the most basic
elements of identity and without which other identifications would not
be possible or diﬃcult.
III. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
Let us assume that a population of N individuals is playing a DG. Let
S be the amount of money to be divided, gi ∈ [0, S] the amount donated
by the dictator i to a recipient, and xi = S − gi the money she keeps.
We assume that subjects derive utility from the money they keep
(consumption xi ∈ [0, S]) and also from a sense of personal identity, Ii:
Ui = Ui(Ii, xi).
First we define the prescription Pi as a normative principle con-
cerning how S should be shared (pii, pi−i).6 Violating this prescription
has a cost ci = |xi − pii| which is symmetric for upward or downward
deviations from the prescription.
Identity is defined as: Ii = I − ci where I is a constant. This is
the stock of identity that an individual has and reaches its maximum
value when a subject i exactly follows her prescription: xi = pii. When
she does not follow it, she loses identity with respect to that maximum
stock.




Ui = Ui(Ii, xi) (1)
s.t.: ci = (xi − pii) (2)
6When we refer to prescriptions in the rest of the paper, we are always referring
to the personal prescription regarding the money one should keep, that is pii.
7In this problem it would be rational for a subject to keep more than the amount
indicated by the prescription. We ignore the case xi < pii.
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xi + gi = S (3)
To parametrize the importance given to consumption and identity
we use a Cobb-Douglas utility function, (Ui = Iαi , x
1−α
i ) where αi will
measure the relative weight given to identity in i’s preferences. We can
substitute restrictions (2) and (3) in the objective function and obtain:
max
xi
[I − (xi − pii)]αix1−αii .
Solving the problem:
xi = (1− αi)[I + pii] (4)
Note that constraint (3) has to hold so that xi ≤ S. We use the
assumption I = S
2
to guarantee that the restriction xi ≤ S holds and
thus to avoid dealing with corner solutions.
Considering the FOC (4) and that pii and xi are observable, and
provided that our data come from the optimal solution to the individual





where I = S
2
. Table 1a (in section 5) shows the empirical results for the
calibration of αi.
IV. EXPERIMENTALDESIGNANDPROCEDURE
For the experiment, 78 undergraduate students were recruited (mainly
Biology students) at the Autonomous University of Southern Baja Cal-
ifornia (UABCS) in La Paz (Mexico) in September 2006. Two experi-
mental sessions were conducted (each one corresponding to a diﬀerent
treatment)8. Students were recruited by a professor of Biology by means
8The two treatments were designed to test if information about the recipient
had an influence on dictators’ behavior. In the first treatment the recipient was
an unknown student, whereas in the second one the recipient was a real student
association for the protection of the sea cucumber. Since there are no diﬀerences in
the behavior and prescriptions between both groups (Mann-Whitney test; z = −.028,
p = 0.978, for actual giving; z = −.573, p = 0.567, for prescriptions), we can pool
the data and analyze it as a single sample.
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of posters placed throughout the school. The message "Do you want to
earn some money?" appeared on all of the posters as well as an E-
mail address for participants to sign up for the experiment. The whole
recruitment process was carried out the week prior to the experiment
(performed on Monday, September 25th).
Why did we choose Mexico? The reason for choosing the UABCS
was that —as far as we knew— no experiment had ever been run there.
Thus, the whole population was completely uninformed about dictators’
behavior and had no previous knowledge about it. We assumed that this
lack of information was strictly necessary to obtain clean results.
In the first session, 26 subjects played the game as dictators. The
other 26 subjects, who played as recipients, waited for half an hour and
then came into the room (once the dictators had left the room through
another door). In the second session, only 26 subjects acted as dictators
since the potential donations were for a student association.
As can be seen in the experimental instructions (see appendix A), we
used a very standard design in order to avoid words such as "sharing"
that could trigger generous behavior. Furthermore, the subjects received
clues indicating that they were allowed to keep all the money. The exact
procedure followed in the experiment is presented below.
Dictators received a package including a large envelope which con-
tained another small envelope9 (for the dictators’ payoﬀs), ten 20-Mexican
peso bills each (or a total of 200 pesos10 ' 15 US$ ' 14 euros), plus a
questionnaire and instructions. The instructions explained the division
problem and indicated that the recipient would be randomly selected
from among the people waiting outside (alternatively a student associa-
tion called “CoBi”).
The instructions were read aloud to guarantee common understand-
ing. The subjects were then told to carry out the task privately with the
help of the large envelope. They had to transfer the money they wanted
to keep into the small envelope, seal it and put it in their pockets. Thus,
the money they wished to donate (to the recipients) had to remain inside
the big envelope. Once the subjects had finished the task, they filled out
a short questionnaire (see appendix B).
After this, they were asked to turn in the questionnaire and sign a
blank receipt form11. They left the instructions and the large envelope
9A brown envelope measuring 25.4x33.0 cm. and a white envelope measuring
10.5x24.1 cm., respectively.
10200 pesos is enough to buy 25 beers at any canteen in La Paz.
11Given that the donation was strictly confidential, we could not ask them to reveal
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(with the donation) on a table. While the recipients were being asked
to come in, the dictators proceeded to leave the room. Communication
among them was impossible.
As is customary in dictator games, we will only focus on dictators’
behavior in the rest of the paper. In sum, our sample comprises 52
dictatorial allocations (xi, i = 1, ...., 52) and 51 answers regarding the
prescription (pii, pi−i)12 (1 null).
V. RESULTS
1. Prescriptions and actual behavior
Figures 1a and 1b plot the revealed prescriptions13 and actual behavior
of the participants in the DG, respectively. Mainly, we can observe the
contrast between the homogeneity of the sample shown in prescriptions
and the heterogeneity of actual behaviors. Thus, whereas most of the
subjects (68.6%) propose a prescription equal to 5, no general trend is
found regarding consumption behavior. Purely selfish behavior is not
clearly observed since only 9 subjects out of 52 keep the whole amount
of money. Neither is it possible to speak about a general egalitarian
behavior as only 12 out of the 52 participants donate 5, far from the
number of participants (35) that reveal this prescription.
the amount of money they kept. We informed them that we would make note of the
average earning in all the cases.
12The exact question was: As regards the task - What division do you think is the
fairest?
13As we have explained in section 2 and formalize in section 3, contrary to Akerlof
and Kranton’s proposal, we consider individual prescriptions. However, can we dis-
tinguish between individual and social prescriptions using our data? To reject the
idea that individual prescriptions are fully socially determined, we elicit the expecta-
tions about the behavior of other participants. Controling for individual prescriptions
(pii), the partial correlation between these expectations and actual behavior (xi) is
not statistically significant (r = .236; p = .153).
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Figure 1a: Prescription Figure 1b: Consumption
Result 1a: The majority of participants (68.6%) reveal a prescription
consistent with an equal split.
Result 1b: Purely selfish behavior is only observed in 17.3% of the
cases and, on average, subjects keep 75% of the endowment.
Remark 1 Actual behavior does not always coincide with purely selfish
behavior nor with the prescriptions revealed by participants.
2. The weight of identity
We will now focus on the subjects’ utility function. Although the utility
function is not observable, we can derive the value for αi for each subject
(see (5) in section 3) by using the experimental information for xi and
pii. By knowing xi and pi we can also compute the value of Ii for every
participant. Tables 1a and 1b show the αi and Ii values for the sample
in our experiment. The lack of homogeneity in the weight subjects as-
sign to identity is a consequence of the heterogeneity of behaviors (xi)
and the stability of prescriptions (pii) in the population. At the same
time, the heterogeneity of parameter αi suggests that we should expect
heterogeneity in identity too. In Table 1b we can observe, however, that
in spite of the fact that we can find in the sample any single value of Ii,
-the range of Ii values goes from 0 to 5- almost half of the sample has
an identity value equal to 514.
14Note that the range of values that αi and Ii adopt is determined by the type of
utility function that we use.
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Table 1a: αi values
αi values N % cum %
.00 5 9.6 9.8
.10 4 7.7 17.6
.20 5 9.6 27.5
.25 1 1.9 29.4
.30 4 7.7 37.3
.31 1 1.9 39.2
.33 4 7.7 47.1
.36 6 11.5 58.8
.38 2 3.8 62.7
.40 5 9.6 72.5
.42 2 3.8 76.5
.50 12 23.1 100.0
Total 51 100.0
Table 1b: Ii values
Ii values N % cum %
0 5 9.8 9.8
1 4 7.8 17.6
2 5 9.8 27.5
3 5 9.8 37.3
4 8 15.7 52.9
5 24 47.1 100.0
Total 51 100.0
Result 2a: The values of αi (the weight of identity) are heterogeneously
distributed in the population.
Result 2b: Almost half of the sample has an identity value equal to
5, that is, given the coherency between behavior and prescription,
almost half of the sample does not suﬀer any loss of identity.
By distinguishing Ii and αi, we can study the type of individual
separately, that is, what every individual identifies with, and the weight
this identity concern has in the subjects’ utility function. Thus, we can
find an individual that identifies with giving 5 -a quite equitable person-
but this identity parameter is not so key in determining her utility, for
instance a αi equal to .10. We argue that this distinction is a more
powerful analytical tool than one in which it is impossible to distinguish
between the behavior a person identifies with and the weight of this
identity concern in her utility function.
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3. Self-understanding
The weight given to identity may be related to individuals’ personal char-
acteristics, socioeconomic variables or other factors. Using data from the
questionnaire the participants answered after the experiment, we can ob-
tain some insight about the determinants of our two key variables: the
weight given to identity (αi) and the personal prescription (pii). We use a
set of variables that includes: variables related to the self-understanding
of participants (selfish and cooperative), socio-demographic variables
(sex, income, siblings), and social capital variables (club and NGO).
In the questionnaire (see appendix B) we included two variables that
are related to the perception that subjects have about themselves (self-
understanding) in the particular situation they are participating in. The
selfish variable refers to a question in which the subjects are asked to
define the situation as one in which they maximize their own welfare or
the welfare of both participants, that is the dictator and the recipient.
This variable ranges from 1 to 7 (1 meaning “maximize joint (me +
recipient) welfare a lot” and 7 meaning “maximize my own welfare a
lot”). The cooperative variable is derived from the participants’ answers
to a question in which they are asked to state if they perceive themselves
as competing or cooperating with their partners. This variable ranges
from 1 to 7 (1 meaning “competing a lot” and 7 meaning “cooperating
a lot”).
The notion of self-understanding -or self-perception- is crucial to the
interpretation of our model in terms of personal identity. We know
that the standard selfish motivation does not explain the behavior of
every participant in the experiment and we also know that the revealed
prescriptions and actual behavior do not always coincide, so what vari-
ables help us to understand the link between prescription and behavior?
To approach this question we estimate the eﬀect of the above-mentioned
variables in both prescriptions and behaviors using a regular OSL model.
We present two models for each variable αi and pii, one including the
variable selfish and one including the variable cooperative.15
15The high correlation between these two variables (r=-.336, p=0.016) recommends
not including both of them in the same model
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Table 2: OLS regressions
αi pii
sex −.051(.307) −.057(.235) .236(.652) .361(.505)
income −.042(.211) −.030(.346) .749(.033) .616(.082)
siblings .024(.375) .007(.785) .277(.326) .164(.580)
self −.045(.001) − .267(.043) −
coop − .054(.000) − −.138(.347)
club .027(.797) .086(.402) .780(.469) .613(.586)
ngo −.170(.134) .129(.224) .791(.490) .355(.760)
c .671(.001) .231(.201) 1.384(.482) 3.282(.107)
R2 .277 .331 .167 .099
n 48 48 48 48
We focus first on the relative importance of the weight of identity
(αi) on the utility function. The most salient result is that no socio-
demographic variable -neither sex, income, siblings- nor social capital
indexes explain the weight that the subjects give to identity. Variables
regarding self-understanding are clearly relevant. On the one hand, self-
ish subjects who consider that their own income is more important than
joint social welfare give less weight to identity. As we will see in the next
section, this means that they prescribe to giving nothing to the partner
or that they are ready to violate their own prescription of giving money
to the partner. On the other hand, cooperative subjects give more weight
to identity, because they are used to respecting the prescription.
Result 3: The weight given to identity in a standard DG depends on
personal self-understanding variables and it is not correlated to
socio-demographic nor social capital variables.
Now we explore the determinants of prescriptions. Interestingly, in-
dividual income is a positive determinant of pii, meaning that the larger
the income the higher the prescription to keep money. Although the
coeﬃcient is reduced (and the R2 is poor), it is significant at conven-
tional levels. In this case, gender, social capital and cooperative behavior
are irrelevant. Moreover, selfish individuals have higher prescriptions to
keep the money.
Result 4: Prescriptions are influenced by social welfare criteria and in-
dividual income.
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4. Arguments provided by subjects
If self-understanding is so important in explaining actual behavior in
the DG, we should be interested in knowing the reasons behind this
self-understanding. In what follows we explore the reasons given by
participants when asked to rationalize their behavior. We hypothesized
that these reasons are the key arguments that contribute to individuals’
self-understanding.
We have just shown that individuals’ self-understanding plays a cru-
cial role in the prescription (pii) and the weight subjects give to identity
(αi). After completing the questionnaire, the subjects were asked to
explain their decisions regarding their donation in the DG. We now ex-
plore the reasons self-reported by subjects when they have to rationalize
their actual behavior. From the whole set of answers we define four
groups of reasons. These groups are labelled as follows and include a
representative comment by the subjects in each case as an example.
• "Equity" (n=14 subjects): An example of "equity" reasoning is
the following: "Taking all the money is not fair, so I consider that
taking 50% is enough and acceptable".
• "Selfishness" (n= 13 subjects): "...because I always want more for
me".
• "Hardship" (n=13 subjects): "...because at this moment I’m hun-
gry and I only have $50 for the next 2 weeks. I know that my
decision is not fair but I took it anyway’.
• "Charity" (n=4 subjects): "...I consider myself a religious person,
I don’t believe in the Church but I believe in God, and He asked
me to give between 10% and 20% to charity. My decision is giving
the highest quantity without aﬀecting my economy".
Figure 2 plots the reported prescription and the amount of money
the dictator kept (xi) by groups.
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Figure 2: pi and xi values by reasons
The first idea that arises from this figure is the contrast between the
homogeneity in prescriptions and behaviors among "equitable" people
and the heterogeneity in both variables in the other three groups. In-
terestingly, there is no variability at all in the "Equity" group. These
individuals have a clear idea about the prescription and almost all of
them follow it.
The group of "selfish" individuals is completely diﬀerent. They show
a notable variability in self-reported prescriptions and also heterogeneity
in relation to the money they keep. The median value is to keep 90% of
the endowment, thus half of the "selfish" group keeps the whole money.
Subjects who declare that they need the money ("Hardship" group)
accommodate the prescription to their own interest or to the need they
manifest to have, while the "Charity" group follows, on average, their
prescription.16
In sum, self-reported arguments indicate that:
16A quantitative measure of the coherency shown by each of these groups of in-
dividuals is the average cost (ci), that is the diﬀerence between what individuals in
each group say they should do (pii) and what they actually do (xi). The average
cost of the selfish group is 1.75, whereas the average cost of the equitable group is
only .14. The "Hardship" and "Charity" groups show intermediate costs, 1.38 and
1.00 respectively.
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Result 5: In the case of "Equity", subjects’ behavior and prescription
almost always fit.
Result 6: Subjects that allude to reasons other than "Equity" show
heterogeneous prescriptions and behaviors. In this case, the be-
havior and the prescription of what should be done do not always
coincide.
VI. DISCUSSION
Under the influence of sociology and social psychology, particularly so-
cial identity theory, the growing literature on economics and identity has
centered more on the concept of social identity than on the concept of
personal identity. In the most influential study to date, that of Akerlof
and Kranton, identity is considered a process of social categorization.
Identity, or sense of self, has to do with the (not always conscious) ac-
commodation of individual action to the categories that others attribute
to individuals. These categories are presented in the form of prescrip-
tions or codes of conduct. Hence, an Afro-American woman from New
York with two children who is a professor of literature and a feminist,
for example, would have a drawer full of labels -woman, Afro-American,
mother, professor, feminist- that would all fit provided that she attempts
to accommodate her conduct to the various prescriptions that determine
the ideal behavior of these categories. Yet, can that person’s behavior,
her economic and non-economic conduct be explained in terms of these
labels? To a large extent it can be, but not without a wide margin of
discretion. As we said in the section 2, it is not easy to establish causal
ties between identity and action and even less so when identity is at-
tributed to large population groups (Hispanics, Blacks, Afro-Americans,
Muslims). Consequently, there are those who prefer to talk about iden-
tification with values, interests and desires, of self-understanding or of
personal identity rather than social identity.
Although we have not rejected the usefulness of the concept of social
identity in this article, we believe that it is necessary to give some ac-
count of the bearers of a set of social identities. With this aim, we have
focused on personal identity in a standard dictator game, that is, in a
context where social distance is large with respect to the subjects’ social
identities and where personal identity is shown with great clarity. By
doing so, we have demonstrated that it is not an easy task to attribute
identities to individuals, not even in such an apparently simple context
as that of the DG. Our experiment has produced the following results.
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1. Incoherency between conduct and prescription. In order to keep
within the conceptual framework established by Akerlof and Kranton,
while bearing in mind the literature on personal identity, we have con-
sidered that one of the key elements of the concept is the coherency
between what one actually does and what one says should be done.
This coherency, which is characteristic of personal identity, provides the
basis for social identity. Identities that people attribute to themselves or
which are attributed to them, turn out to be unsustainable in the long
run if that person does nothing that the identity prescribes. Clearly, the
person who says "I’m a feminist" or "I’m egalitarian" would have an
ideal about what those labels prescribe and will judge her action accord-
ing to those prescriptions. In our experiment, however, actual conduct
and the prescription belong to two diﬀerent worlds since while a minor-
ity does in eﬀect donate half of the money to the recipient, the majority
states that they should donate half.
2. The weight given to identity is highly heterogeneous. When instead
of attributing identities to large population groups, we descend to the
level of individual decisions as we have done here, we find that the weight
individuals give to identity is very heterogeneous. Common codes of
conduct do not, by any means, exist; a fact which has to do with how
individuals understand themselves.
3. The weight of identity and the nature of the prescription have to do
with individuals’ self-understanding. The regression analysis has shown
that the weight of identity (αi) is correlated with the image subjects have
of themselves. In an initial process of self-understanding, we asked the
subjects to define themselves as being either selfish (eﬃciency minded) or
cooperative (competitive). This self-understanding turns out to be key
to understanding the weight that individuals attach to identity. Selfish
individuals give less weight to identity than non-selfish individuals.
4. Individuals who play the DG on selfish terms show less coherency
between action and prescription, while individuals who consider them-
selves to be equitable show greater coherency. Given that we have defined
personal identity à la Akerlof-Kranton as the accommodation between
action and prescription (personal prescription in our case), the fact that
a person manifests selfish values in a DG does not mean that they attach
less weight to identity. Personal identity is the coherency between what
is given and what one says should be given. The selfish individual gives
the same weight to identity as the non-selfish individual when action and
prescription coincide. In a subsequent process of self-understanding in
which subjects were asked to give reasons for their actions, it is striking
that the selfish subjects are the least coherent, whereas the equitable
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subjects are the most coherent.
All of this casts doubts on the concept of identity and on the gener-
alized identities that are attributed to individuals. It is very likely that
these attributions conceal interests, beliefs and desires that go further in
explaining conduct than the very identity itself. Furthermore, as several
experimental and non-experimental studies have shown, group pressure
-which does not exist in our experiment- can force individuals to align
with others around identity because it is beneficial to them or because
they are obliged to do so.17 Unquestionably, the concept of identity
should continue to play an explanatory role in economics and other so-
cial sciences given that there are clear cases in which this concept is
the driving force behind individuals’ decisions. Nonetheless, when de-
scending to the level of personal identity, several contradictions arise
that oblige us to be cautious when attributing identities to people and
attempting to explain economic conduct in terms of these identities.
VII. CONCLUSION
A vast amount of literature has focused on the deviation of the standard
selfish result in dictator games. However, this literature has not dealt
with the weight of identity as a cause for these possible deviations. In
consonance with the recent interest in the economics of identity, in this
article we have conducted an experiment to test how individuals maxi-
mize a function in which identity has a notable weight. However, given
the ambiguities regarding the concept of social identity, we have focused
on personal identity as a basic element of identity and without which
it would be impossible to understand social identity. In so doing, we
have shown that, in eﬀect, some but not all subjects deviate from the
standard selfish result for reasons of identity -they give half the amount
and prescribe that half should be given. Others, albeit a very small mi-
nority, fit the selfish result for reasons of identity -they do not give and
prescribe that it is not necessary to give. The large majority, however,
show a heterogeneous conduct in which action and prescription do not
coincide. Many subjects who perceive or understand themselves to be
selfish, establish an equitable prescription that they do not subsequently
fulfill. The heterogeneity of the results suggests that we should move
with caution when attributing identities to individuals.
17In the literature on racial conflict, it is clearly seen how people who had never
before posed the question of their "identity" (Hutus and Tutsis, Bosnians and Serbs)
find themselves obligated to do so out of pure fear. See Hardin (1995).
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Hello! My name is Pablo Brañas and I am a Research Professor at the
University of Granada in Spain. I’ve come to the UABCS to do this
work and give a seminar.
The purpose of this Experiment is to study how individuals make
decisions in certain contexts. The instructions are simple and if you
follow them carefully, you will receive an amount of money at the end of
the experiment in a confidential manner. Nobody will know how much
money you have earned.
Feel free to ask any questions you may have at any time by raising
your hand (not high). Apart from those questions, any type of com-
munication between you is prohibited and will be cause for immediate
exclusion from the Experiment.
Before continuing there are a few things you should know.
i) The money you are going to use does not belong to the researchers,
but was donated by a Spanish foundation for scientific purposes.
ii) Secondly, as you will notice, no one has asked you your name at
any time. Everything is confidential.
Now what you must do is:
- Place the money in the two envelopes in the way that you consider
most convenient. (Given the large amount of space available, this
operation can be done quite discretely).
- Seal the envelopes.
- Put the envelope that you want to keep in your pocket, and,
- Leave the other envelope on top of the table.
Remember, everything is private. Nobody will know how you have
resolved this decision problem. Keep in mind that the DECISION you
are going to make is as REAL as the MONEY in front of you.
When you have completed these tasks, please fill out the question-
naire. When you have finished remain in silence until you are told you
can leave.
Thank you for your collaboration!
18In appendix A and appendix B we present translations of the original instructions




1) In what way do you think you are competing or cooperating with
your partner? (Competing A LOT=1; Competing AVERAGE=2; Compet-
ing A LITTLE=3; Neither competing nor cooperating=4; Cooperating A
LITTLE=5; Cooperating AVERAGE=6; Cooperating A LOT=7)
2) What do you think is more important in this experiment, to maximize
both your own welfare and that of your partner or only your own welfare?
(joint welfare A LOT=1; joint welfare AVERAGE=2; joint welfare A LIT-
TLE=3; Neither joint welfare nor my own =4; only my welfare A LITTLE=5;
only my welfare AVERAGE=6; only my welfare A LOT=7)
3) As regards the task→What division do you think is the fairest? Why?
4) As regards the task → What do you think the others have done?
5) How many brothers or sisters do you have?
6) How many people live in your house including yourself?
7) How many friends do you have?
8) Are you male/female?
9) What are you studying at the UABCS?
10) Do you belong to an NGO? Which one?
11) Do you belong to a club? Which one?
12) Do you go to church? How many times a week?
13) What do you think your income level (economic level of your family) is
as compared to the average Mexican? (poor VERY=1; poor AVERAGE=2;
poor A LITTLE=3; Neither poor nor rich=4; rich A LITTLE=5; rich AV-
ERAGE=6; rich VERY=7)
14) Do you like people? (aversion to people A LOT=1; aversion AV-
ERAGE=2; aversion A LITTLE=3; Neither aversion nor love =4; love A
LITTLE=5; love AVERAGE=6; love people A LOT=7)
15) Do you like animals? (aversion to animals A LOT=1; aversion AV-
ERAGE=2; aversion A LITTLE=3; Neither aversion nor love =4; love A
LITTLE=5; love AVERAGE=6; love animals A LOT=7)
16) To FINISH, How did you divide the money: (for me____, for my
partner ____)?
17) Can you explain why you made this decision? (you can write on the
back of the page)
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